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Abstract   
 
Recent credit market problems have resulted in actions by 
Congress, the Bush and Obama Administrations and regulatory agencies 
to preserve the integrity of the banking system.  Although the issue of 
bank transparency has not been considered as integral to the development 
of a comprehensive policy for the American banking system, there are 
significant gaps in the data required to analyze conditions in banking and 
to develop possible remedies. This paper analyses certain elements 
integral to U.S. and international banking:  1.) the concept of bank 
transparency in an environment where the ownership and control of 
leading financial institutions is no longer subject to the rights and 
limitations inherent in traditional private ownership;  2.) the requirements 
of the Basel protocols and of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act;  3.) the cost of 
capital for the banking  industry, which has been a private matter and 
subject to educated conjecture but not widespread understanding; and  4.) 
the returns earned by the most significant credit product used by business, 
lines of credit, and the problems in receiving fair returns for the capital 
invested.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The current credit crisis has significantly impacted the U.S. and global banking 
industries. While there have been past concerns about the integrity of the banking system, 
the scale of government loans and assumption of ownership, at least temporarily, is 
unprecedented in scope. Recent nearly catastrophic incidents have resulted in actions by 
the regulatory agencies to preserve the integrity of the banking system, and by the U.S. 
Congress and the Obama Administration in proposing a new regulatory structure for 
oversight of the financial system.  
Until now, the issue of bank transparency has not been considered as integral to 
the development of a comprehensive policy for the American banking system. The 
concept of “bank transparency” involves “public disclosure of reliable and timely 
information that enables the use of that information to make an accurate assessment of a 
bank's financial condition, performance, business activities, risk profile and risk 
management practice” (Basel Committee, 1998, page 1).  There is widespread access to 
information about the industry through such organizations as the Federal Reserve System, 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (of the Department of Commerce), the Department of 
the Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and for global financial 
institutions, the Bank for International Settlements. However, there are significant gaps in 
the data required to analyze conditions in banking and to develop possible remedies.   
This paper focuses on issues integral to U.S. and international banking: 
• The concept of bank transparency in an environment where the ownership 
and control of leading financial institutions is no longer subject to the 
rights and limitations inherent in traditional private ownership. 
• The cost of capital for the banking industry, which has been a private 
matter and subject to educated conjecture but not widespread 
understanding. 
• The returns earned by the most significant credit product used by business, 
lines of credit, and the problems in receiving fair returns for the capital 
invested. 
Specific recommendations are suggested to improve bank transparency, to better manage 
the credit process, and to enhance future returns. 
 
2. Bank Transparency 
 
The purpose of bank regulation is to eliminate systemic, depositor and taxpayer 
risk to the extent possible, and to assure reasonable (but not excessive) returns.  This can 
only occur if bank managers, regulators and other market participants have timely access 
to reliable information that enables them to evaluate a bank's activities and the risks 
inherent in those activities. While the banking systems of other countries have been 
criticized for a lack of transparency (Chen, 2000; Alexander, 2004), the situation has 
certainly come to the shores of the U.S. in the financial crisis that began in earnest in 
2008. The procedural requirements of bank transparency bears examination in the context 
of the unprecedented taxpayer rescue of various American banks.   
Unlike firms in the nonfinancial sector of industry, a mismanaged bank may cause 
a run on that bank and on other financial institutions perceived as susceptible to failures 
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in their counterparty obligations.1  The traditional approach of corporate governance in 
the financial sector has involved regulators exercising statutory authority to develop 
procedural standards.  This approach has been somewhat compromised as deregulation 
has led to the emergence of global financial markets, allowing banks to expand 
international operations and enter into multiple lines of financial business. Complex risk-
management strategies developed that allowed financial products to be priced and risk 
exposures to be hedged to improve expected profits while generating unacceptable levels 
of risk and problems of liquidity.  
 
3. Bank Transparency in Basel I and II  
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has attempted to address the issue 
of corporate governance of banks and multinational financial conglomerates, and has 
issued several reports addressing specific topics on corporate governance and banking 
activities. These reports set forth the essential strategies and techniques for the sound 
corporate governance of financial institutions, including “conducting corporate 
governance in a transparent manner” (Basel Committee I, page 8).  
The New Basel Capital Accord (widely known as Basel II) contains a detailed 
framework of rules and standards that supervisors can apply to the practices of senior 
management and the board for banking groups (Basel Committee II). Bank supervisors 
will now have the discretion to approve a variety of corporate-governance and risk-
management activities for internal processes and decision-making, as well as substantive 
requirements for estimating capital adequacy and a disclosure framework for investors.   
Pillar Three of Basel II addresses corporate governance concerns by focusing on 
transparency and market-discipline mechanisms to improve the flow of information 
between bank management and investors.  The goal is to align regulatory objectives with 
the bank's incentives to earn profits for its shareholders. Proposals are included to 
improve transparency by linking regulatory capital levels with the quality of disclosure. 
Under this approach, shareholders would possess more and higher quality information 
with which to make decisions about well-managed and poorly-managed banks. These 
standards of corporate governance are scheduled to become international in scope and to 
be implemented into the regulatory practices of the leading industrial nations. 
 
4. Bank Transparency in Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
American corporate governance has not gone as far as Basel II, although Section 
401 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-204) required the SEC [the 
Commission] to report on “… any recommendations of the Commission for improving 
the transparency and quality of reporting off-balance sheet transactions in the financial 
statements and disclosures required to be filed by an issuer with the Commission.”  The 
                                                           
1
 A counterparty is the other side of a transaction, be it a vendor, customer or other market 
participant. These relationships, particularly in banking, involve huge monetary commitments and 
trust between the counterparties, and a lack of trust in the ability to settle commitments to 
repurchase securities eventually led to the failures of Bear, Stearns and Lehman Brothers. There 
has been some coverage of this situation in the business press; for a discussion of the Bear 
Stearns situation, see Kelly (2008).  
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result was a series of recommendations published in 2005, although no administrative or 
legislative action has yet resulted.2 
The public, acting through Congress, the U.S. Treasury Department and the 
Federal Reserve System, has made presumably temporary investments in certain troubled 
members of the banking industry. As a result, it can be argued that information 
previously held as confidential should no longer be treated as such.3 Taxpayers and/or 
appropriate government agencies have the right to understand how decisions are made 
using debt and equity capital that may be subject to public guarantees and subsidization 
in the event of catastrophic losses. As significant components of the asset and liability–
net worth portions of the balance sheet, returns on credit products and costs of capital 
constitute two of the most important of these information elements that could be 
considered for public disclosure. 
 
5. Bank Cost of Capital 
 
Until recently, there were no systematic attempts at developing cost of capital 
estimates for the U.S. banking industry. Maccario, Sironi and Zazzara (2002) have now 
provided data on capital costs based on the IBES database, containing historical and 
forecast earnings for publicly-listed companies in various countries. The purpose of their 
research was to compare U.S. banking results with that of other developed economies, 
and so the analysis stopped before a comprehensive calculation was achieved. Table 1 
provides this valuation, with a weighted average cost of capital estimated at about 6% for 
the period 1993 – 2001. This result determines the minimum threshold return that must 
be earned by banks on the various products and services provided to customers in order 
to prevent the destruction of shareholder value.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The banking industry is probably unique in our economic system in having a 
consistent cost of capital regardless of the size, risk or financing of specific member 
institutions. This is because of the substantial regulation governing acceptable levels of 
asset risk, lending protocols, minimum capital requirements, and other factors that are 
unique to specific companies in other industries. The primary variation in banking is in 
the cost of equity capital, with smaller and riskier institutions required to pay a premium 
to float new stock and/or to pay higher dividend yield than banks considered as safer 
investments. The impact of this factor is relatively minor, with equity a constant 8 to 9% 
of total assets throughout the period studied. 
 
                                                           
2
 “For purposes of this Report, the Staff characterizes ‘transparent’ financial reporting as 
reporting that provides investors and other users of financial statements with appropriate 
information to assess the material risks, rewards, rights, and obligations associated with 
arrangements;” Securities and Exchange Commission (2005), at p. 12. 
 
3
 Curiously, there has not been recent in-depth exploration of this issue in legal scholarship. The 
leading discussion probably is Allen (1987), who concludes that there is no clear corporate 
expectation to privacy, particularly for such regulated industries as banking. 
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6. Bank Lines of Credit 
 
Bank lines of credit are borrowing facilities for a stated amount of unsecured 
credit for a specified time period, usually one year. While the Federal Reserve does not 
specify the extent of lines of credit activity in its publications, available statistics show 
that commercial and industrial (C&I) loans are typically 20 to 25 percent of all loans and 
leases, and lines of credit are the most important lending mechanism within the C&I 
sector, probably constituting 15 percent of all bank loans and leases.4 
Lines of credit may be committed, where a fee has been paid to guarantee the 
borrower’s access to the funds. The cost of a committed line is about ⅓rd of one percent, 
with typical pricing of the used portion of the line is about 1½ to 2 percent above Federal 
funds or LIBOR. These data are available from several sources; for example, see Sufi 
(2009).  The line may also be uncommitted, when no fee has been paid. Banks generally 
make best efforts to provide funds for uncommitted lines although may be unable to do 
so during times of significant economic distress. Until these lines are drawn by the 
borrower, the potential liability to the banking institution does not appear on the balance 
sheet but is noted in the accompanying footnotes. 
Credit lines are used as short-term sources of liquidity, often when seasonal cash 
disbursements exceed cash collections. In addition, lines of credit support the issuance of 
commercial paper, which are notes issued by creditworthy companies without any 
collateral backing. Covenants often apply to lines of credit and other types of loans, such 
as revolving credit agreements which have longer durations.5 These covenants are 
restrictions that require a certain level of performance by borrowers, including limitations 
on new debt beyond current borrowings, changes in business strategies or senior 
management, and various financial compliance requirements, often as measured by 
standard ratios in such categories as liquidity, leverage, activity and profitability.  
 
7. The Profitability of Credit Lines 
 
The returns on lines of credit were previously estimated by the author (Sagner, 
2002, Chapter 5), and the model used in that research has been substantially revised for 
the purposes of developing the analysis reported in this paper. Risk-adjusted returns are 
provided in Table 2, showing returns on committed lines, and Table 3, showing returns 
on uncommitted lines.  The allocation of capital to each loan type is based on standard 
risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC) standards as required in the Basel protocols. 
The revenue to the bank is net of the costs of officer calling, credit review and loan 
documentation. Default rates on lines of credit were analyzed using data from the 
Dealscan database available through the Loan Pricing Corporation (Sufi, 2009, Table 7). 
 
                                                           
 
4
 Individual bank call reports provide statistics on lines of credit, as do SEC filings including 10-
K and annual reports. 
 
5
 As with other types of bank lending, banks are now more restrictive in their revolving loan 
agreements, with shortened durations and higher fees; Ng (2009).  
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[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
As is shown in these analyses, U.S. banks can only make positive returns − 
between 10 and 11 percent − when at least a nominal committed fee is earned. 
Uncommitted lines return 6.7% after default losses are included, which is just about 
equivalent to the bank cost of capital given the customary imprecision in compiling these 
calculations. The seemingly illogical decision of banks to provide lines of credit without 
commitment fees is due to three factors: 
 
1. Banks have used profitability models only since about 1985, and the assumptions 
in these models are of questionable validity given the strong negotiating position 
of large corporate borrowers, at least until the present credit crisis. In other words, 
a strong corporate can effectively negotiate away commitment fees and other loan 
covenant conditions, and banks have been unwilling to hold the line on cost 
recovery strategies. 
 
2. Credit products have been subsidized in the past by non-credit products, including 
cash management, shareholder services, trade finance, and trust and fiduciary 
services, and since the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, by 
investment banking. Banks may knowingly (or unknowingly) provide no or low 
return credit products such as credit lines in order to have the opportunity to sell 
higher return non-credit products.  
 
3. Certain groups of companies are profitable to banks for credit products. These 
include middle market and small businesses, and situations where reasonable 
returns can be earned in specific industries due to the absence of lending 
competition. Examples of the latter include the brokerage industry, where certain 
banks dominate securities lending, e.g., Bank of New York Mellon and J.P. 
Morgan Chase, and commodities lending, J.P. Morgan Chase, Northern Trust and 
Bank of America.; and factoring, which has been largely provided by non-bank 
financial companies but could be an attractive market should CIT fail to regain 
market share post-bankruptcy. 
 
8. Global Banking Returns 
 
It is apparent from Table 4 data that the experience in the U.S. with regard to the 
financing of the banking industry is substantially at variance from other countries, 
particularly with regard to the cost of equity capital. The mean difference between the 
country and banking cost of equity capital is negligible for the countries examined, 
indicating that banking is perceived as equivalent to the risk and return from other 
investment opportunities. In the case of the U.S., banks have traditionally been perceived 
as substantially less risky as other investments; in this sample, the difference between 
American country and banking industry equity costs were 17.7% lower during the period 
under study.  
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The fallacious perception by investors that U.S. banking is not risky – as we now 
know from the events of the previous two years – has led to heroic efforts to prevent 
systemic failure, the loss of billions of dollars of market value in bank debt and equity, 
the disappearance of important financial institutions, and the ongoing consideration of 
new regulation and law. It is not being suggested in this paper that a single action would 
have prevented these outcomes. However, greater bank transparency would allow bank 
managers, depositors, shareholders and regulators to better understand the costs and 
returns from various financial institution activities.   
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
There are several possible outcomes if steps toward improving bank transparency 
were implemented. 
 
• More informed pricing of products. Although this discussion has focused 
on the cost and returns from lines of credit, banks have traditionally under- 
or overpriced specific products to meet competitive pressures. This is a 
highly debatable process in the context of the prospect of bank failure and 
the requirements of Basel I and II. Should taxpayers be required to 
subsidize lines of credit, providing underpriced lending facilities to the 
largest corporations, when similar relief is not available to medium and 
small business, or to individuals? 
 
• Recovery of bank cost of capital. The struggle to earn the cost of capital 
may have lead to unacceptably risky strategies by certain banks, including 
securitization, sub-prime lending, the use of flawed risk-assessment 
models, an undue dependence on credit card loans, lending on commercial 
real estate, and other actions. Costs of capital and returns by product line 
should be understood by regulators and supervisory government agencies, 
and banks must be encouraged to earn the threshold requirement to avoid 
destroying shareholder value. 
 
• Market perception of the risk/reward relationship. The experience of 
global banks clearly indicates that the markets have seriously 
underestimated the risk of U.S. banks. Transparency would assist investors 
in correctly pricing such risk, and may encourage greater operational 
efficiency and more thoughtful allocation of capital. 
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Table 1 
Components of calculation of bank cost of capital ($ billions) 
Sec. A: 
Financing Assets Liabilities 
Owners 
Equity  
 C+I Loans TAssets DemDpt  TimeDpt 
Borrow-
ings 
 S-T 
Debt L-T Debt TLiab Net Worth  
1993 $591.10 $3649.1 $816.6 $1714.8 $537.4 $1354.0 $1975.0 $3329.0 $320.1  
1994 $650.60 $3877.3 $796.7 $1734.8 $637.4 $1434.1 $2120.7 $3554.8 $322.5  
1995 $720.70 $4217.2 $773.4 $1890.0 $717.1 $1490.5 $2367.0 $3857.5 $359.7  
1996 $780.00 $4387.9 $713.9 $2138.9 $730.3 $1444.2 $2577.6 $4021.8 $366.1  
1997 $847.80 $4790.8 $687.1 $2396.3 $853.6 $1540.7 $2828.5 $4369.2 $421.6  
1998 $939.60 $5261.7 $670.7 $2603.2 $1017.5 $1688.2 $3100.9 $4789.1 $472.6  
1999 $990.20 $5577.2 $631.9 $2825.5 $1118.5 $1750.4 $3324.1 $5074.5 $502.7  
2000 $1078.40 $6066.4 $598.8 $3156.2 $1236.4 $1835.2 $3731.1 $5566.3 $500.1  
2001 $1018.00 $6417.2 $632.3 $3483.4 $1245.5 $1877.8 $3969.6 $5847.4 $569.8  
  
 Sec. B: Costs of Debt & Equity (%) 
Sec. C: Proportion of Debt & 
Equity (percent) 
Sec. D: Calculation of WACC 
(Sec. B Costs times Sec. C Proportions) 
 CSTDbtCp CLTDbtCp CEqCap 
S-T 
Debt/TA 
L-T 
Debt/TA NW/TA 
WACS-
TDbt 
WACL-
TDbt WACEqCap TlWACC 
1993 3.00 7.30 9.90 0.371 0.541 0.088 0.0111 0.0395 0.0087 0.0593 
1994 5.70 6.30 10.20 0.370 0.547 0.083 0.0211 0.0345 0.0085 0.0640 
1995 5.10 7.80 11.90 0.353 0.561 0.085 0.0180 0.0438 0.0101 0.0720 
1996 5.20 5.90 9.00 0.329 0.587 0.083 0.0171 0.0347 0.0075 0.0593 
1997 5.30 6.40 8.20 0.322 0.590 0.088 0.0170 0.0378 0.0072 0.0620 
1998 4.40 5.70 5.90 0.321 0.589 0.090 0.0141 0.0336 0.0053 0.0530 
1999 5.20 4.80 7.30 0.314 0.596 0.090 0.0163 0.0286 0.0066 0.0515 
2000 5.90 6.40 9.00 0.303 0.615 0.082 0.0178 0.0394 0.0074 0.0646 
2001 2.00 5.20 8.10 0.293 0.619 0.089 0.0059 0.0322 0.0072 0.0452 
See attached notes 
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Notes for Table 1: 
 
Section A:  Financing 
Assets:  
C&I Loans 
Total Assets (TAssets) 
Liabilities: 
 Demand Deposits (DemDpt) 
 Time Deposits (TimeDpt) 
 Borrowings 
 Short-Term Debt (S-T Debt) 
 Long-Term Debt (L-T Debt) 
 Total Liabilities (TLiab) 
Net Worth 
 
Section B: Costs of Debt & Equity 
Cost of Short-Term Debt Capital (CSTDbtCp) 
Cost of Long-Term Debt Capital (CLTDbtCp) 
Cost of Equity Capital (CEqCap) 
 
Section C: Proportion of Debt & Equity (percent) 
 Short-Term Debt ÷ Total Assets (S-T Debt/TA) 
 Long-Term Debt ÷ Total Assets (L-T Debt/TA) 
 Net Worth ÷ Total Assets (NW/TA) 
 
Section D: Calculation of WACC 
 Weighted Average Cost of Short-Term Debt (WACS-TDbt) 
 Weighted Average Cost of Long-Term Debt (WACL-TDbt) 
 Weighted Average Cost of Equity Capital (WACEqCap) 
 Total Weighted Average Cost of Capital (TlWACC) 
 
 
Sources: 
 
Federal Reserve Board, “Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United 
States,” Statistics and Historical Data, Table H.8, July 2009; at 
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/statisticsdata.htm. 
 
Aurelio Maccario, Andrea Sironi, and Cristiano Zazzara, “Is Banks' Cost of Equity 
Capital Different Across Countries? Evidence from the G10 Countries Major Banks” 
(May 2002), SDA Bocconi Research Division Working Paper No.02-77, Table 9; at 
ssrn.com/abstract=335721. 
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Table 2 
Calculation of returns on committed lines of credit  
Sections A, B & C 
 
A: Return before Credit Underwriting 
B: Return After 
Credit 
Underwriting 
C: 
Return 
After 
Default 
Revenue 
to Bank 
($000) 
Fee (in 
basis 
points) 
Credit 
Facility 
 
Capital 
Alloca-
tion 
 
% 
Cap 
All 
% 
Return 
Revenue 
to Bank 
($000) 
% 
Return 
% 
Return 
Not Drawn 
Short-Term  $     50.0   20 bp   $25MM  $0  0% Infinite  $    25.0  INF  
Long-Term  $   125.0   25 bp   $50MM  $1.0MM  2% 12.50%  $    85.0  8.50  
Total Return  $   175.0    $1.0MM   17.50% $  110.0  11.00 10.13% 
Drawn 
Short-Term  $   137.5  55 bp  $25MM  $1.3MM  5% 11.00%  $  112.5  9.00  
Long-Term  $   400.0  80 bp  $50MM  $2.5MM  5% 16.00%  $  360.0  14.40  
Total Return  $   537.5    $3.8MM   14.33% $  472.5  12.60 11.60% 
 
Notes: 
Cap All = capital allocation (under Basel II rules) 
INF: infinite 
Drawn (borrowed) credit facilities display fee income for 3 years. 
Interest calculated as simple interest, without regard to the time value of money. 
% Return: $ Revenue divided by Capital Allocation 
Section C % Return: Section B Total Return less the default rate of 7.9%, divided by Capital 
Allocation 
 
Assumptions: 
For drawn (borrowed) lines of credit, the fee includes the commitment fee from the not drawn 
portion + 35 bp above LIBOR  
for short-term and 50 bp above LIBOR for long-term. 
Credit underwriting costs are $25,000 for short-term and $40,000 for long-term lines of credit. 
Fee in bp is multiplied times the credit facility to derive the revenue to the bank. 
 
Source for default rates: 
Amir Sufi, “Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis,” Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 22 (2009), pp. 1057-1088, at Table 7; at ssrn.com/abstract=723361. 
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Table 3 
Calculation of returns on uncommitted lines of credit 
Sections A, B & C 
 
A: Return before Credit Underwriting 
B: Return After 
Credit 
Underwriting 
C: 
Return 
after 
Default 
Revenue 
to Bank 
($000) 
Fee (in 
basis 
points) 
Credit 
Facility 
Capital 
Allocation 
 
% 
Cap
All 
 
% Re-
turn 
Revenue 
to Bank 
($000) 
% 
Return 
% 
Return 
Short-Term  $     87.5  35 bp  $25MM  $1.25MM  5% 7.00%  5.00%  
Long-Term  $   250.0  50 bp  $50MM  $2.50MM  5% 10.00%  $210.0  8.40%  
Total 
Return  $   337.5    $3.75MM   9.00% $272.5  7.27% 6.69% 
 
Notes and Assumptions: 
See Table 3. In addition: 
For drawn (borrowed) lines of credit, the fee includes the commitment fee from the not drawn 
portion + 35 bp above LIBOR for short-term and 50 bp above LIBOR for long-term. 
Credit underwriting costs are $25,000 for short-term and $40,000 for long-term lines of credit. 
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Table 4 
Country financing costs (1993 – 2001) (in %) 
 
 
Long-Term 
(L-T) Interest 
Rate 
Country 
Ke 
Banking 
Ke 
Banking Ke 
less L-T 
Interest Rate 
Country 
Ke less 
Banking 
Ke 
Difference:  
Country & 
Banking Ke 
Belgium 5.01 8.67 8.90 3.89 -0.22 2.58 
Canada 6.80 10.75 12.03 5.23 -1.28 11.90 
Switzerland 3.94 6.63 8.16 4.22 -1.53 23.11 
Germany 5.87 7.01 6.98 1.11 0.02 -0.35 
France 5.98 7.38 7.67 1.68 -0.29 3.93 
Great Britain 6.62 9.56 8.88 2.27 0.67 -7.03 
Italy 7.81 8.71 7.64 -0.17 1.07 -12.24 
Japan 2.78 2.43 2.79 0.01 -0.36 14.80 
Netherlands 5.78 10.15 9.04 3.26 1.10 -10.85 
U.S. 6.20 10.72 8.82 2.63 1.90 -17.68 
Mean 5.68 8.20 8.09 2.41 0.11 -1.31 
 
Notes: 
L-T: long-term; Ke: cost of equity capital 
% Difference Cty & Bk Ke: Country Ke less Banking Ke as a % of Country Ke 
Although included in the source data, Spain and Sweden have been excluded from these 
calculations as those countries had insufficient global banks for a representative sample. 
 
Source: Calculated by the author from data in Aurelio Maccario, Andrea Sironi, and Cristiano 
Zazzara, “Is Banks' Cost of Equity Capital Different Across Countries? Evidence from the G10 
Countries Major Banks,” (May 2002), SDA Bocconi Research Division Working Paper No. 02-77, 
Table 9; at ssrn.com/abstract=335721. 
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